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UPDATE BY MEANS OF INFERENCE RULES 
TEODOR C. PRZYMUSINSKI AND HUDSON TURNER 
D Katsuno and Mendelzon have distinguished two abstract frameworks for 
reasoning about change: theory revision and theory update. Theory reui- 
sion involves a change in knowledge or belief with respect to a static world. 
By contrast, theory update involves a change of knowledge or belief in 
a changing world. In this paper, we are concerned with theory update. 
Winslett has shown that theory update should be computed “one model at 
a time.” Accordingly, we focus exclusively on the update of interpretations. 
We begin with a study of revision programming, introduced by Marek and 
Truszczynski to formalize interpretation update in a language similar to 
logic programming. While revision programs provide a useful and natural 
definition of interpretation update, they are limited to a fairly restricted 
set of update rules. Accordingly, we introduce the more general notion of 
rule update-interpretation update by arbitrary sets of inference rules. We 
show that Winslett’s approach to update by means of arbitrary sets of for- 
mulas corresponds to a simple subclass of rule update. We also specify a 
simple embedding of rule update in Reiter’s default logic, obtained by aug- 
menting the original update rules with default rules encoding the common- 
sense law of inertia-the principle that things change only when they are 
made to. @ Elsevier Science Inc., 1997 a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Katsuno and Mendelzon [5] have distinguished two abstract frameworks for reason- 
ing about change: theory revision and theory update. Theory revision involves a 
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change in knowledge or belief with respect to a static world. For example, suppose 
you are booked on a flight, but told only that your destination is either Australia or 
Europe, i.e., that australia V europe holds. If sometime later you learn, in addition 
to what you already know, that you were not booked on a flight to Europe, i.e., that 
leurope holds, then you are likely to conclude that your destination is Australia, 
i.e., that australia holds. 
By contrast, theory update involves a change of knowledge or belief in a changing 
world. Again suppose you are booked on a flight, and told only that your destina- 
tion is either Australia or Europe, i.e., that australia V europe holds. Suppose you 
later learn that the situation has changed and all flights to Europe have just been 
cancelled, i.e., that Teurope holds. Under these circumstances, you are not likely to 
conclude that you are going to Australia, i.e., that australia holds. In fact, it may 
be the case that your flight has just been cancelled. 
In this paper, we are concerned with theory update. A key insight into the nature 
of update is due to Winslett [15], who showed that reasoning about actions should 
be done “one model at a time.” That is, when reasoning about the outcome of 
an action, we must consider its effect in each one of the states of the world that 
are consistent with our (possibly incomplete) knowledge of the current state of the 
world. This insight is reflected in the general definition of theory update due to 
Katsuno and Mendelzon, which can be formulated as follows. Let l? and T be sets 
of propositional formulas. A set T’ of formulas is a “theory update” of T by I if 
Models(T’) = {I’ : 31 E Models(T) . I’ is “an update of I by I?“}. 
We see by the form of this definition that in order to determine “theory update,” 
it suffices to define when an interpretation I’ is an update of an interpretation 
I by a theory r. Accordingly, in this paper, we focus exclusively on “interpreta- 
tion update.” However, in contrast to the work cited above, we investigate a more 
general case of update by means of sets R of inference rules, instead of sets I of 
formulas. 
The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of revision programs, intro- 
duced by Marek and Truszczynski in a series of recent papers [668] to formalize 
interpretation update in a language similar to the language of logic programming. 
Revision programs are essentially sets of positive logic program rules, which can 
be interpreted as inference rules and used to update interpretations. Marek and 
Truszczynski proved that logic programs with stable semantics are embeddable into 
revision programs. We show that, conversely, there is a simple embedding of revision 
programs into logic programs with stable semantics.’ Thus, the two formalisms are 
precisely equivalent. We go on to demonstrate that various properties of revision 
programs are easily derived from this translation and from known properties of 
logic programs. 
Our translation of revision programs into logic programs utilizes a simple and 
intuitive encoding of the commonsense law of inertia, which is the principle that 
things do not change unless they are made to. The fact that revision programming is 
easily captured in logic programs using such inertia rules helps clarify the nature of 
revision programming, and as we will see, of interpretation update more generally. 
While revision programs provide a useful and natural definition of interpretation 
update, they are limited to a fairly restricted set of update rules, and thus are 
‘Chitta Bard [l] independently found a somewhat mot-e complex embedding. 
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not sufficiently expressive to capture more complex interpretation updates which 
may be described by arbitrarily complex formulas or, more generally, by arbitrary 
inference rules. Accordingly, in the second part of the paper, we introduce the 
notion of rule update-interpretation update by arbitrary sets of inference rules. 
The proposed formalism is not only more general and expressive than revision 
programming, but also has a very simple and natural definition. 
We show that Winslett’s [15] approach to update by means of arbitrary sets of 
formulas corresponds to a simple subclass of rule update. We also investigate how 
the “directionality” of inference rules contributes to the expressiveness of rule up- 
date. Finally, we specify a simple embedding of rule update into default logic [12], 
obtained by augmenting the original update rules with inertia axioms analogous to 
those used in the translation of revision programs into logic programs. The trans- 
lation into default logic provides a bridge between our newly introduced formalism 
and a well-known nonmonotonic formalism. 
The introduction of rule update provides a new framework for interpretation 
update, and thus also for theory update. In spite of its great simplicity, rule update 
constitutes a powerful and expressive mechanism which can be used to determine 
updates of theories by arbitrarily complex sets of inference rules and is appli- 
cable to various knowledge domains. For example, in [9], McCain and Turner apply 
rule update to the problem of reasoning about the effects of actions. Moreover, the 
simple embedding of rule update in default logic-obtained by adding default rules 
encoding the commonsense law of inertia-provides a crucial element of proposals 
in [13, 141 for representing commonsense knowledge about actions in default logic 
and logic programming. 
Preliminary definitions appear in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, we specify a 
simple embedding of revision programming in logic programming, and show that 
basic results obtained by Marek and Truszczyriski for revision programs are easily 
deduced from this embedding, using known properties of logic programs. In Sec- 
tion 5, we introduce an alternative characterization of revision programming, and 
in Section 6, we define the more general notion of rule update as a natural ex- 
tension of this alternative characterization. In Section 7, we compare rule update 
to Winslett’s [15] definition of update by means of propositional formulas, and we 
investigate how the “directionality” of inference rules influences rule update. In Sec- 
tion 8, we specify an embedding of rule update in default logic. Section 9 consists 
of a few concluding remarks. 
2. PRELIMINARY DEFINITIONS 
Let K be a propositional language. For any set r of formulas from K, by Cn(r) we 
denote the least logically closed set of formulas from K that contains r. Inference 
rules over K will be written as expressions of the form 
where 4 and $ are formulas from K. We often find it convenient to identify a 
propositional formula 4 with the inference rule 
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Let R be a set of inference rules over K, and let r be a set of formulas from K. We 
say l? is closed under R if for every rule 4/II, E R, if 4 belongs to r, then II, does 
too. We write 
if 4 belongs to the least logically closed set of formulas from K that contains l? and 
is closed under R. 




where all of (Y, pi, . . , p,, y are formulas from K. For a default rule r as in (2.1), we 
define prerequisite(r) = cy, just$cations(r) = {pi,. . ,,&}, and consequent(r) = y. 
If prerequisite(r) = True, we sometimes omit it and write : PI,. . . , pn/y instead. If 
justifications(r) is empty, we identify r with the corresponding inference rule (Y/Y. 
If, in addition, prerequisite(r) = l?ue, we sometimes simply write y. 
A default theory over K is a set of default rules over K. Let D be a default theory 
over K, and let E be a set of formulas from K. We define the reduct of D with 
respect to E, denoted by DE, as follows. 
DE = prerequisite(r) 
consequent(r) ’ 
r E D and for all fl E justijkations(r), -p $ E 
> 
We say that E is an extension of D if E is the least logically closed set that is closed 
under DE.2 
A logic program over K is a set of logic program rules over K, which are expressions 
of the form 
AcBl,..., B,,notCi ,..., notC, 
where A, Bi, and C, are atoms from K (m, n > 0). If n = 0 for all program rules, 
then the program is called positive. By interpreting lists of atoms in rule bodies as 
conjunctions of atoms, we can identify a positive logic program with a propositional 
Horn theory.3 
Definition 2.1 (Stable models) [2]. Let P b e a logic program over a language K, 
and let M be an interpretation of K. By the quotient of P modulo M, we mean 
the positive logic program P/M obtained from P by: 
. removing from P all rules which contain a negative premise “not C” such 
that C is true in M, and 
l deleting all negative premises “not c” from the remaining rules of P. 
Since the program P/M is a Horn theory, it has a unique least model 
Least(P/M). The interpretation M is called a stable model of the program P 
if M = Least(P/M). 
2Default logic is due to Reiter [12]. The definition of an extension given above follows [4], and 
is equivalent to Reiter’s definition. 
3Before continuing, we recall the fact that propositional programs and default theories can be 
viewed as instantiated versions of programs and (quantifier-free) theories with variables. Thus, 
the results in this paper apply to the general case. 
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Definition 2.2 (Extended logic programs) [3] ( see also [ll]). Let K be a propositional 
language. Let K* be an extended propositional language obtained by augmenting 
K with new propositional letters -A, for some (or all) propositional letters A in 
K. The new propositional symbols -A are called strong (or “classical”) negation 
of A. A logic program P over the extended language K* is called an extended 
logic program. A stable model of P over K* is an extended stable model of P if 
there is no atom A E K such that both A and -A are true in M. 
3. EMBEDDING REVISION PROGRAMS INTO 
LOGIC PROGRAMS 
Revision programs were introduced by Marek and Truszczynski in a series of pa- 
pers [6-81 in order to formalize interpretation update in a language similar to the 
language of logic programming. In [6], they showed that logic programs with sta- 
ble semantics are embeddable into revision programs. In this section, we specify a 
remarkably simple embedding of revision programs into logic programs with stable 
semantics. Consequently, the two formalisms are precisely equivalent. In the next 
section, we demonstrate how one can easily derive various properties of revision 
programs from this translation and from known properties of logic programs. 
3.1. Revision Programs 
We first recall the definition of revision programs. Following [7], we fix a countable 
set U. 
Definition 3.1 (Revision programs) [7]. A revision in-rule or, simply, an in-Tale, is 
any expression of the form 
in(p) + in(qi), . . , in(h), out(a), . , out(s,) (3.1) 
where p, qi, 1 5 i 5 m, and sj, 1 5 j 5 n, are all in U and m, n 2 0. A revision 
out-rule or, simply, an out-rule, is any expression of the form 
out(p) +- in(ql),. . . ,in(qm), out(sl),. . . ,out(sn) (3.2) 
where p, qi, 1 5 i 5 m, and sir 1 5 j 5 n, are all in U and m, n > 0. A collection 
of in-rules and out-rules is called a revision program. Any subset B of U is called 
a knowledge base. 
Clearly, revision programs can be syntactically viewed as positive logic programs 
(or as ~propositional Horn theories). However, as we will see below, they are given a 
special revision semantics which differs significantly from the least model semantics 
of positive logic programs. We first need the definition of the necessary change 
determined by a revision program. 
Definition 3.2 (Necessary change) [7]. Let P be a revision program with least 
model M. The necessary change determined by P is the pair (I,O), where 
I = {q: in(q) E M} and 0 = {q: out(q) E M}. The revision program is called 
coherent if I n 0 = 8. 
Now we are ready to define the so-called P-justified revisions. 
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Dejinition 3.3 (P-justified revision) [7].* Suppose that P is a revision program, Br 
is the initial knowledge base, and BE is the revised knowledge base. The reduct of 
P with respect to (BI, BR) is defined as the revision program PB~ / BI obtained 
from P by: 
l removing from the body of each rule in P all atoms in(u) such that a E 
BI n BR, and all atoms out(a) such that a $ Br U BR ; 
l removing every rule of type (3.1) or (3.2) such that qi $ BR, for some i, 
lIi<m, or sj E BR, for some j, 1 < j 5 n 
If (I, 0) is the necessary change determined by PB, 1 Br and PB~ 1 BI is coherent 
and BR = (BI U I) - 0, then BR is called a P-justified revision of BI. 
The reader is referred to [7] for the motivation of the above definition. The results 
established in the remainder of the paper, e.g., Theorem 3.1, will further clarify its 
intuitive meaning and its relationship to other well-established notions. 
According to the following lemma, the last condition BR = (BI U I) - 0 can be 
equivalently stated as BR = (BR n BI) U I and BR = (BR n RI) U 0, where by 2 
we denote the complement U - A of the set A. 
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that BI, BR, 0, I are subsets of U such that 0 n I = 0. The 
following two conditions are equivalent: 
(i) BR=(BIuI)-0; 
(ii) BR = (BR f’ BI) U I and BR = (BR n BI) U 0. 
PROOF. Suppose that (ii) holds. We have to show that BR = (BI - 0) U I. Clearly, 
(ii) implies that BR > I. M oreover, if q E BI - 0, then q does not belong to BR, 
and therefore q E BR. This shows that BR > (BI - 0) U I. 
If q E BR, then, by (ii), q E BI U I. Moreover, q @’ 0, which shows that BR & 
(BJ - 0) U I, and therefore BR = (BI - 0) U I = (BI U I) - 0. 
Suppose now that (i) holds. We have to show that BR = (BR n BI) U I and 
BR = (BR n ET) U 0. Clearly, by (i), BR > (BR n BI) U I. Moreover, if q E BR, 
then either q E I or q E BI, which shows that BR C (BR n BI) U I, and therefore 
BR=(BRnBI)Ur. 
Since 0 is disjoint from BR, we infer that ER 2 (ER n BI) u 0. Moreover, if 
q E BR and q @ 0, then q $! BI, which shows that i?R & (BR n BI) U 0, and there- 
fore i?R = (BRnB1)uO. 0 
3.2. Translating Revision Programs into Logic Programs 
We next show how to embed revision programs into logic programs with stable 
semantics. We employ a propositional language K whose set of propositional letters 
is {in(q) : q E U} U {out(q) : q E U} U {inI : q E U} U {outI : q E U}. 
Definition 3.4 (Translating revision programs into logic programs). The translation 
of a revision program P and an initial knowledge base BI into a logic program 
4Although the definition given here differs slightly from the one given in [7], it is easily seen 
to be equivalent. 
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is defined as the logic program P(P, BI) = PI U PN U P over K: consisting of the 
following three subprograms. 




for all q E Br and all s # Br. 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
Inertia Rules PN: If q was initially in (respectively, out), then after revision it 
remains in (respectively, out) unless it was forced out (respectively, in): 
in(q) +- inI( not out(q) 
out(q) t outI( not in(q) 
for all q E U. 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
Revision Rules P: All the in-rules and out-rules that belong to the original 
revision program P. 
A stable model M of P(P, BI) is called coherent if it does not contain both in(q) 
and out(q), for any q E U. 
Observe that the above translation is quite simple. It preserves the original re- 
vision program P, and adds to it the set of facts representing the initial state BI 
and two simple inertia axiom schemas stating that things do not change from one 
state to another unless they are forced to.5 
Example 3.1. Consider the revision program 
P = {out(u) + in(b)} 
and the initial knowledge base BI = {a, b}. Its translation P(P, BI) into a logic 
program consists of P together with the initial conditions and inertia axiom@: 
inr (a) 
inr (b) 
in(a) +- inl(a),not out(a) 
in(b) + inr(b),not out(b). 
One easily checks t,hat program P(P, BI) has a unique stable model, which contains 
only the atoms7: 
{out(a), in(b)} 
and therefore corresponds to the unique P-justified revision BR = {b}. 
“By comparison, the translation in [l] is complicated by the introduction of an auxiliary ab- 
normaiity predicate. 
‘Notice that the inertia axioms for out can be skipped in this case. 
71n addition to the initial state atoms in,(a), inl(b). 
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Example 3.2. Consider now the revision program P: 
in(a) t out(b) 
in(b) + out(a) 
and the initial knowledge base BI = {}. Its translation ‘P(P,B1) into a logic pro- 
gram consists of P together with the initial conditions and inertia axioms’: 
outI 
nut1 (b) 
out(a) +- outl(a),not in(a) 
out(b) +- out~(b),not in(b). 
One easily checks that program P(P, BI) has two stable models Mi and Mz, which 
contain only the atomsg: 
MI = {out(a), in(b)} 
Mz = {in(a), out(b)} 
and therefore correspond to the two P-justified revisions {b} and {a}. 
We now prove that the translation specified in Definition 3.4 indeed yields 
an embedding of revision programming into logic programming under the stable 
semantics. 
Theorem 3.1 (Embedding revision programming in logic programming). Let P be a 
revision program, and let Bl be an initial knowledge base. There is a one-to-one 
correspondence between P-justified revisions of BI and coherent stable models OJ 
its translation P(P, BI) into a logic program. 
More precisely, to every P-justified revision BR of BI there corresponds a 
unique stable model M of P(P, BI) such that 
BR = {q: in(q) E M} (3.7) 
U - BR = {q: out(q) E M} (3.8) 
and, conversely, for every coherent stable model M of P(P, BI)? the set BR = 
{q: in(q) E M} is a P-justified revision of BI. 
PROOF. (+) Suppose that M is a coherent stable model of P(P, BI), and let BR = 
{q: in(q) E M}. W e must show that BR is a P-justified revision of Br. 
By Definition 2.1, M is the least model of the positive logic program Q = 
P(P, BI)/M, namely, the quotient of P(P, BI) modulo M. Since both the initial 
knowledge rules PI and the original revision rules P in P(P, BI) = PI U PN UP are 
positive, only the inertia rules PN 
in(q) +- inr(q),not out(q) (3.9) 
out(q) + outl(q),not in(q) (3.10) 
will be affected by the quotient transformation, and therefore Q = PI U (Pry /M) UP. 
‘Notice that the inertia axioms for in can be skipped in this case. 
“In addition to the initial state atoms outr(a), o&r(b). 
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Define Bk = {q: out(q) E M}, and let Br = U - BI. According to Definition 2.1, 
in order to construct the quotient P,/M, we have to remove from Pry all the inertia 
clauses (3.9) such that q E Bh and all inertia clauses (3.10) such that q E BR. 
Subsequently, we have to remove all the negative premises from the remaining 
clauses of Phi. As a result of the quotient transformation, we therefore obtain the 
program PN/M consisting of rules 
in(q) + inr(q), for all q $ Bk (3.11) 
out(q) +- outr(q), for all q $ BR. (3.12) 
Let us now observe that Bk = ER = U - BR. Indeed, since M is coherent, 
the sets BR and Bk are disjoint. Suppose that there is a q such that q $ BR and 
q $ Bk. Then both clauses in(q) + inI and out(q) + outI belong to the 
quotient program Q. Since we must either have q E BI or q E ??I and since Ad is 
the least model of Q, we conclude that either in(q) or out(q) must belong to M, 
which contradicts our assumption that q # BR and q $ Bk. 
Clearly, M is also the least model of a modified program obtained by removing 
some premises which are true in M. Therefore, we can further reduce the quotient 
P~J/M of the set of inertia rules to the set &I/M of all clauses (facts) of the form 
in(q) + , for all q E BR n BI (3.13) 
out(q) + > for all 4 E BR n B1. (3.14) 
In addition, the quotient program Q contains the initial knowledge rules PI: 
inr(q) +- 3 for all q E BI (3.15) 
outI + 3 for all q E 231 (3.16) 
and all the original revision program in-rules (3.1) and out-rules (3.2) in P. 
We now show that BR is a P-justified revision of BI. According to Definition 3.1, 
in order to compute the reduct PB,{ 1 BJ of P, we first have to remove from the body 
of each revision rule in P all atoms in(q) such that q E BI n BR, and all atoms 
out(s) such that s E Br n RR. Notice that these are precisely the atoms that must 
be true in M due to the rules (3.13) and (3.14). Subsequently, we remove from 
the (already reduced) revision program every rule of type (3.1) or (3.2) such that 
qi 4 BR, for some i, 1 < i 5 m, or sJ E BR, for some j, 1 < j 5 n, thus obtaining 
the reduct PB~ 1 BI. Notice that by doing so, we are removing from P those rules 
whose premises are false in M. As a result, the stable model M remains the least 
model of the reduced quotient program Q* = PI U (~N/M) U PB,( 1 BI. 
Let MCJ be the least model of the reduct P B,, 1 BI, and let (I, 0) be the necessary 
change of PB,? 1 BI, i.e: I = {q: in(q) E MO} and 0 = {q: out(q) E MO}, The 
program Q* = PI U (PN/~@ Ups, IB I consists of three independent parts: the 
initial knowledge rules (3.15) and (3.16), the (reduced) inertia axioms (3.13) and 
(3.14), and the reduct PB, / BI which no longer contains any premises from the 
other two parts. Consequently, the set of atoms that belong to the stable model M, 
which is the least model of this reduced quotient program Q”, consists of: 
l {inI : q E BI} u {outr(q) : q E RI}, 
l {in,(q) : q E BR n BI} u {out(q) : q E BR n BI}, 
l {in(q) : q E I} u {o&(q) : q E O}. 
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This shows that 
BR = (4: in(q) E M} = (BR n BI) u 1, (3.17) 
BR = u - BR = (4: Out(q) E M} = (BR n BI) u 0. (3.18) 
Since PB, ( BI is coherent by assumption, in order to verify that BR is a P-justified 
revision of BI, it suffices to establish that BR = ( BI U I) - 0. However, this follows 
immediately from Lemma 3.1. 
(+) The proof in the opposite direction is very similar, and thus will be skipped. 
We begin with a P-justified revision BR of BI. From Lemma 3.1, we conclude that 
the conditions BR = (BR n BI) U I and B R = (BR rl BI) U 0 must be satisfied. 
Using this fact and reversing the steps of the above proof, we produce the required 
stable model M. 0 
4. PROPERTIES OF REVISION PROGRAMS 
The embedding of revision programs into logic programs with stable semantics 
helps clarify the notion of revision programming, in part because it allows us to 
utilize our knowledge of an already well-established and thoroughly investigated 
nonmonotonic formalism. For instance, many of the results obtained by Marek and 
Truszczynski in [668] are simple consequences of the embedding. In this section, we 
illustrate this claim with a few examples. 
We begin with the following result from [7] stating that logic programs with 
stable semantics are embeddable into revision programs. 
Theorem 4.1 [7]. Let P be a logic program, which consists of rules of the form 
p +- 41,. . , qnr not ~1,. , not s, 
and let R(P) be the revision program obtained by replacing each rule of P with 
the corresponding in-rule 
in(p) +- in(ql), . , in(q,), out(sl), . . . , out(s,). 
An interpretation M is a stable model of P if and only if its set of atoms BR is 
an R(P)-justified revision of BI = 8. 
PROOF. By Definition 3.4, the translation P(R(P), 8) of the revision program R(P) 
into a logic program consists of R(P) itself and the initial knowledge rules outI +-- 
for all q E U, together with the inertia rules” 
out(q) +- not in(q), for all q E U. 
After performing a single step of partial evaluation on the premises out(sj) of 
rules from R(P) (by using the above inertia rules), the rules of R(P) become equiv- 
alent to 
in(p) +- in(a), . . , in(q,), not in(sr), . . . , not in(sn) 
“Notice that we can skip the rules for in and remove the premises outs 
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and thus they are equivalent (up to renaming) to the rules of the original program P. 
Theorem 3.1 now easily implies the equivalence between stable models of P and 
R(P)-justified revisions of BI. 0 
In light of the embedding of revision programming into logic programming 
(Theorem 3.1), this result shows that the two formalisms are in fact precisely 
equivalent. Given this equivalence, the complexity results obtained in [8, Theorem 
4.21, regarding the NP-completeness of some problems involving the computation 
of P-justified revisions, can be easily seen to follow from similar results already 
known about the computation of stable models. 
Finally, the fact that the translation P(P, B 1 0 a revision program is completely ) f 
symmetric with respect to in and out atoms immediately yields the following result. 
Theorem 4.2 [7]. Let P be a revision program, and let BI be a knowledge base. A 
knowledge base BR is a P-justified revision of BI if and only if U - BR is a 
PD-justified revision of U - BI, where P D is the dual of the program P obtained 
by simultaneously replacing everywhere in by out and vice versa. 
5. ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF REVISION PROGRAMMING 
In this section, we consider an alternative embedding of revision programming in 
logic programming, which is somewhat more compact than the previous one (Def- 
inition 3.4), but otherwise very similar. This second embedding suggests a simple 
alternative characterization of revision programming, which serves as the basis for 
the definition of interpretation update by arbitrary sets of inference rules-or rule 
update-that is introduced in the next section. 
For this alternative embedding, we use extended logic programs under the sta- 
ble semantics (Definition 2.2), and we employ a more compact encoding of the 
commonsense law of inertia-the principle that things change only when made to. 
Given the set U associated with a revision program P, let K’ be the propositional, 
language with the atoms U U {-a : a E U}. We will translate revision program P, 
along with an initial knowledge base BI into an extended logic program over K’. 
In this section, it will be convenient to represent interpretations of the extended 
language K* as sets of atoms a and ~a. 
Definition 5.1 (Translation of revision programming into extended logic program- 
ming). Let P be a revision program, with initial knowledge base BI. Let r(P) 
be the positive extended logic program over K* obtained from P by replacing 
each in-rule (3.1) in P with the corresponding rule 
and similarly replacing each out-rule (3.2) in P with the corresponding rule 
Let P*(P, BI) be the extended’logic program over K* that is obtained by aug- 
menting r(P) with the rule 
a +- not -a (5.1) 
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for each atom a E BI and the rule 
-a f- not a 
for each atom a E V \ BI. 
(5.2) 
Unlike the first translation from revision programming to logic programming 
(Definition 3.4), this second translation does not include an explicit representation 
of the initial knowledge base Br, but instead uses BI to determine which rules of 
the forms (5.1) and (5.2) are to be added to the positive extended logic program 
r(P). Intuitively speaking, rules of the forms (5.1) and (5.2) correspond to a partial 
evalution of the Inertia Rules [(3.5) and (3.6)] with respect to the Initial Knowledge 
Rules [(3.3) and (3.4)]. In th is manner, we obtain a more compact translation which, 
nonetheless, still reflects the commonsense law of inertia. 
Example 5.1. Consider again the revision program P and initial knowledge base 
Br from Example 3.2. The program P*(P, B 1 consists of the following four rules: ) 
a + -b 
b + Na 
-a + not a 
-b +- not b. 
Recall that the two P-justified revisions of BI are the knowledge bases {u} and 
{b}. Observe that these two P-justified revisions of BI correspond precisely to the 
two extended stable models of P* (P, BI), which are {a, wb} and {-a, b}. 
In order to state the correctness of this second translation, we introduce the 
following auxiliary definition, relating knowledge bases and interpretations of Ic* in 
the obvious way. 
Definition 5.2. Let M be the injective function from the set of knowledge bases 
(that is, the set of subsets of V) to the set of interpretations of Ic* such that, for 
any knowledge base B, M(B) = B U {-a: a E V \ B}. 
Theorem 5.1 (Embedding revision programming in extended logic programming). 
Let P be a revision program, with initial knowledge base BI. A lcnowledge base 
BR is a P-justified revision of Br if and only if the interpretation M(BR) is an 
extended stable model of P*(P, BI). M oreover, for every extended stable model 
M of P*(P, BI), there is a unique knowledge base BR such that M = M(BR). 
We do not include a proof of this theorem, which follows in straightforward 
fashion from the correctness of the first translation (Theorem 3.1). 
Now, it is easy to verify that for any knowledge base BR, we have 
P* (P, BI) 
M(Bd 
= r(P) U (M(BI) n M(BR)). 
This observation immediately yields the following corollary to Theorem 5.1. 
Corollary 5.1 (Alternative characterization of revision programming). Let P be 
a revision program, with initial knowledge base BI. A knowledge base BR is 
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a P-justified revision of BI if and only if M(B R as an extended stable model of ) 
n(P) u (M(B1) n M(BR)). 
6. RULE UPDATE 
Revision programs are sets of revision in-rules and out-rules, which can be inter- 
preted as positive logic program rules, or as inference rules, and used to update 
interpretations. In this section, we introduce a more general approach to interpre- 
tation update, which allows update by means of arbitrary sets of inference rules. 
We call this more general notion rule update. 
Rule update has a simple fixpoint definition which can be viewed as an ex- 
tension of the alternative characterization of revision programming introduced in 
Corollary 5.1 of the previous section. Rule update not only extends revision pro- 
gramming, but also includes as a special case the approach to update by means 
of formulas introduced by Winslett in [15]. Furthermore, rule update has a sim- 
ple embedding in default logic, using essentially the same inertia rules used in the 
previous section to embed revision programming in extended logic programming. 
In the remaining sections of the paper, we will represent interpretations of a 
propositional language K as maximal consistent sets of literals from K. This choice 
of representation allows us to characterize the set of facts that a pair I and I’ of 
interpretations have in common simply by taking their intersection I n I’. 
Definition 6.1 (Rule update). Let ‘R be a set of inference rules. Let I and I’ be 
interpretations. We say that I’ is an update of I by R if 
1’={L: InI’tRL} 
where L ranges over literals. 
The literals in I n I’ can be understood as the facts that are “preserved by 
inertia” as we move from interpretation I to interpretation I’. In accordance with 
the commonsense law of inertia, our definition of rule update does not require any 
additional “explanation” for the truth of these literals in I’. The definition does 
require, though, that all new facts in I’-that is, the literals in I’ \ I-be explained 
by the rules in 72, along with the literals in I n I’. Accordingly, we see that I’ is an 
update of I by R if and only if the following two conditions are met: 
l for all literals L in I’ \ 1, I n I’ TV L; 
l Cn(I’) is closed under R. 
That is, roughly speaking, I’ must be “consistent with’ the rules in R, and every 
literal in I’ must be explained-either it held in I or it was forced to become true. 
Example 6.1. Consider the following: 
First, we will show that 12 is an update of Ii by Ri. Notice that Ii n 12 = {a, c} 
and that Ii n I2 t,, lb. So for all literals L E I, \ II, II n 12 ~~~ L And since 
Cn(Iz) is closed under ‘RI, we have shown that I2 is an update of II by ‘RI. 
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A symmetric argument shows that the interpretation {a, b, x} is also an update 
of Ii by Rr. On the other hand, if we take 13 = {la, b, c}, then Ii n 13 = {b, c}; and 
we see that II n Is Ifn, la. So 1s is not an update of Ii by Ri. One can similarly 
show that the interpretation {a, lb, x} is not an update of 11 by Ri. 
The following theorem, establishing that rule update indeed extends revision 
programming, is easily seen to follow from the alternative fixpoint characterization 
of revision programming captured in Corollary 5.1, in light of the strong resemblance 
between that characterization of revision programming and the definition of rule 
update. 
Theorem 6.1 (Rule update subsumes revision programming). Let P be a revision 
program, with initial and final knowledge bases BI and BE. Let R be the set of in- 
ference rules obtained by replacing each in-rule (3.1) in P with the corresponding 
inference rule 
q1 A...AqmA-S1 A...Ays, 
P 
and similarly replacing each out-rule (3.2) in P with the corresponding inference 
rule 
q1 A... A qm A TS1 A . A TS, 
‘P 
Let I and I’ be interpretations such that In U = BI and I’ n U = BH. Bn is a 
P-justified revision of BI if and only if I’ is an update of I by R. 
‘7. PROPERTIES OF RULE UPDATE 
In this section, we show that rule update includes as a special case the approach 
to update by means of formulas introduced by Winslett [15].11 More generally, 
we briefly investigate how the “directionality” of inference rules contributes to the 
expressiveness of update by means of inference rules. 
Definition 7.1 (Formula update)?‘Given interpretations I, I’, and I”, we say that 
I’ is closer to I than I” is if I” n I is a proper subset of I’ n I. 
Let l? be a set of formulas. Let I and I’ be interpretations. We say that I’ is 
a formula-update of I by I? if I’ is a model of l? such that no model of I is closer 
to I than I’ is. 
The “principle of minimal change” that is transparently captured in this defini- 
tion is closely related to the commonsense law of inertia that underlies rule update, 
as we will see. Intuitively speaking, the principle of minimal change stipulates that 
there be as few changes as possible, whereas the commonsense law of inertia assumes 
that things change only when made to. 
“MC&in and Turner [9] discuss this comparison at some length, in the framework of reasoning 
about action. Propositions 7.1-7.3 below are essentially identical to Propositions 2-4 from [9]. 
“The definition given here is equivalent, and almost identical, to the corresponding definition 
in [15]. (Recall that we represent interpretations as maximal consistent sets of literals.) 
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In order to compare formula update and rule update in a precise fashion, we 
introduce the following additional definition. 
Definition 7.2. Given a set R of inference rules, we define a corresponding set of 
formulas Theory(R) as follows: 
Theory(R) = 
{ 
4 3 11, : $ E R 
> 
Thus, for example, Theory(Ri) = {a > lb V -x}. 
Let R be a set of inference rules and I an interpretation. Notice that Cn(I) is 
closed under 72 if and only if I is a model of Theory(R). Thus, every update of I 
by R is a model of Theory(R). In fact, we have the following stronger result, which 
shows that rule update satisfies the principle of minimal change. 
Proposition 7.1. Let ‘R be a set of inference rules and I an interpretation. Every 
update of I by R is a formula update of I by Theory(R). 
PROOF. Assume that I’ is an update of I by 72. So I’ is a model of Theory(R). 
Let I” be a model of Theory(R) such that I’ n I 2 I” I- I. We need to show that 
I” = I’. Since I’ and I” are both interpretations, it is enough to show that I’ C I”. 
I’={L: InI’hL} (I’ is an update of I by R) 
c {L: InI”kR L} (I’ n I c I” n I) 
c {L: I” tx L} (I” n I c I”) 
= I” ( I” is a model of Theovy(R)). 0 
The converse of Proposition 7.1 does not hold in general. For instance, we have 
seen (Example 6.1) that Is is not an update of Ii by Ri, and yet it is easy to verify 
that Is is a formula update of Ii by Theory(R1). 
On the other hand, the following proposition shows that if every inference rule 
in R has the form 
True 
+ 
then the updates of I by R will be exactly the formula updates of I by Theory(R). 
Thus, rule update includes formula update as a simple special case. And since 
rule update also subsumes revision programming, we see that rule update both 
generalizes and unifies these two approaches to interpretation update. 
Proposition 7.2. Let ‘R be a set of inference rules, each of which has the form 
True/4. For any interpretation I, eueq formula update of I by Theory(R) is 
also an update of I by 72.. 
PROOF. Assume that I’ is a formula update of I by Theory(R). Let I” be a model 
of (I n I’) u Z%eov(R). So I” is a model of Theory(R). Also, I’ n I C I”, so 
I’ n I C I” n I. Since no model of Theory(R) is closer to I than I’ is, we can 
conclude that I” = I’. Thus, I’ is the only model of (In I’) U Theory(R). It follows 
that I’ = {L : (In I’) U Theory(R) t L}. Due to the special form of the rules in R, 
we see that (I n I’) U Theory(R) t C#J iff I n I’ TV d, for every formula 4. Therefore, 
I’ = {L: In I’ tR L}. 0 
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We may say that Proposition 7.2 shows that “directionality” plays no essential 
role in inference rules of the form True/q5. To consider another extreme case, the 
following straightforward proposition shows that rules of the form 
b 
False 
only eliminate updates. 
Proposition 7.3. Let R be a set of inference rules. Let I and I’ be interpretations. 
For any formula 4, I’ is an update of I by R U {q5/False} if and only if I’ is an 
update of I by R such that I’ k 4. 
In fact, we see that if every rule in R has the form d/False, then I’ is an update 
of I by R if and only if I is a model of Theory(R) and I’ = 1. Intuitively speaking, 
this is the most pronounced example of the effect of the directionality of inference 
rules. At the other extreme, we have seen that if every rule in R has the form 
True/4, then I’ is an update of I by R if and only if I’ is a formula update of I by 
Theory(R). Thus, in such cases, the directionality of rules has no effect at all. We 
briefly explore in the remainder of this section the middle ground that lies between 
these two extremes. 
Definition 7.3. Let R, R’ be sets of inference rules. We say R’ is as strong as R if 
for all sets l? of formulas, if l? is closed under ‘R’, then P is closed under R. 
It is clear that if R’ is as strong as ‘R, then for any formula 4, I t~j q5 whenever 
l? FR 4. We use this fact in the proof of the following proposition. 
Proposition 7.4. Let R and R’ be sets of inferences rules such that Cn( Theory(R)) = 
Cn( Theory(R’)). Let I be an interpretation. If R’ is as strong as 72, then every 
update of I by R is also an update of I by 72’. 
PROOF. Assume that 73’ is as strong as R, and that 1’ is an update of I by R. 
Since Cn(Theory(R)) = Cn(Theory(R’)) and Cn(1’) is closed under R, we know 
that Cn(1’) is closed under R’. Consider any L E I’. Since I n I’ k~ L, and since 
R’ is as strong as R, it follows by previous observation that I n I’ FE’ L. 0 
Now we define an ordering on inference rules that, intuitively speaking, allows 
us to compare the degree of directionality in (otherwise similar) rules. 
Definition 7.4. Let 4, &, $, $’ be propositional formulas. 
T?&’ 
II, - v iff b, t q5’ and !- (4 3 +,) = (6 3 $9 





TC TbVTc- TaVTbV--c 
Roughly speaking, the idea behind this ordering of rules is that, as we move from 
left to right, the degree of directionality in the rule is lessened, which makes the 
rule “stronger.” Below, we make this claim precise. 
Let R be a set of inferences rules, and let r and r’ be inference rules such that 
r 3 T’. It is clear that Cn( Theory(R U {r})) = Cn( Theory(R U {r’})). Moreover, it 
follows easily from the definitions that R U {r’} is as strong as 77, U {r}. Thus, we 
have the following corollary to Proposition 7.4. 
Corollary 7.1. Let 72 be a set of inferences rules, and let r,r’ be inference rules such 
that r 5 r’. Let I be an interpretation. Every update of I by R U {r} is also an 
update of I by R U {r’}. 
8. EMBEDDING RULE UPDATE IN DEFAULT LOGIC 
In this section, we specify a very simple embedding of rule update in default logic, 
using essentially the same inertia rules used in Section 5 to embed revision pro- 
gramming in logic programming. The resulting default theories use normal defaults 
to encode the commonsense law of inertia.13 
Definition 8.1 (Translating rule update into default logic). Given a set R of infer- 
ence rules and an interpretation I, let 
Theorem 8.1 (Embedding rule update in default logic). Let R be a set of inference 
rules and I an interpretation. The following hold. 
l An interpretation I’ is an update of I by R if and only if Cn(I’) is an 
extension of Vo(R, I). 
l For every consistent extension E of V(R, I), there is an interpretation I’ 
such that E = Cn(1’). 
PROOF. For part one, let I’ be an interpretation. Observe that 
2)(R, I)C”(“) = R u (In I’) 
which justifies the last step below. 
I’ is an update of I by R iff I’ = {L: I n I’ tn L} 
iff Cn(I’) = (4: I n I’ tR $5) 
ifl Cn(I’) is the extension of R U (I n I’) 
ifl Cn(I’) is an extension of D(R, I). 
For part two, assume that E is a consistent extension of D(72, I). Suppose there 
is no interpretation I’ such that E = Cn(I’). So there is an atom A such that 
A $ E and 7A $ E. But D(R,I) includes one of the following two inertia rules: 
:A :-A -- 
A 1A 
13See [13, 141 for applications of essentially this encoding of the commonsense law of inertia in 
default theories and logic programs for representing knowledge about actions. 
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It follows that ZT(R,Qb includes either A or lA, and thus E does also. ‘Con- 
tradiction. q 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Rule update is a simple and expressive framework for interpretation update which 
extends both revision programming and Winslett’s approach to update by means 
of formulas. Furthermore, it has a simple embedding in default logic, based on a 
straightforward encoding of the commonsense law of inertia-the principle that 
things change only when made to. 
In [7], Marek and Truszczynski proposed a different extension of revision pro- 
gramming, called disjunctive revision programming. Disjunctive revision programs 
consist of rules of the following form: 
in(pi) V...V in(pk)V out(rl)V. ..V out(rl) 
t in(ql), . , in(q,), out(sl), . . , out(s,). 
However, the proposed definition exhibits what may be undesirable behavior. For 
example, given the disjunctive revision program 
P = {in(a) v in(b)} 
and initial knowledge base BI = {a}, we obtain the knowledge base BR = {a, b} as 
one of the two P-justified revisions of BI, which violates the principle of minimal 
change. l4 By contrast, the only p u date of the interpretation {a, 4) by 
R = {u v b} 
is {a, 4) itself. In fact, as noted earlier, Proposition 7.1 shows that rule update 
never violates the principle of minimal change, although, as we have seen, it is 
actually based on a principle of “causal” or “justified” change. 
Finally, since revision programming is equivalent to logic programming under 
the stable semantics, computational methods developed for the stable semantics 
(or, perhaps, for its approximations, such as the well-founded semantics) can be 
used to provide a query answering mechanism for revision programming. Similarly, 
since rule update can be embedded in default logic, it should be possible to use 
computational methods developed for default logic to compute rule update. 
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